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Abstract
Committees are an important scenario for reaching consensus. Beyond stan-
dard consensus-seeking issues, committee decisions are complicated by a dead-
line, e.g., the next start date for a budget, or the start of a semester. In committee
hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong major-
ity, the default is to hire no one—an option that may cost committee members
dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if
not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper we
propose a model for the above scenario—Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)—
based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We explore theoretical features
of CUDs, particularly focusing on convergence guarantees and quality of the final
decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of
CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member be-
havior, lazy vs. proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences
between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it
may often be best to have bots play on the voters’ behalf.
Keywords: Social Choice, Consensus, Iterative Voting, Group Decisions,
Deadline
1. Introduction
We study the problem of arriving at a joint decision (a consensus) under a
deadline, based on the preferences of multiple voters. The voters’ task is to find
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an alternative that the majority agrees upon, before some predefined deadline is
reached. The majority is also predefined and can vary from 51% of the votes
to unanimous agreement. As different individuals have different preferences, a
decision does not occur immediately, and more than one round of voting may be
required. Hence, a voting process takes place, where voters potentially change
their votes as the deadline approaches.
We define a strict, formal, time-bounded iterative voting process. The process
begins with each voter revealing her most-preferred alternative. If no alternative
reaches the required majority, a multi-stage voting process begins. At each stage,
all voters that wish to change their ballot apply for a voting slot. A voter may
choose to change her ballot if, for instance, she realizes that her most-preferred
alternative has no chance of being elected. She then might decide to vote for
another alternative. One voter is chosen randomly from all those who applied
for a voting slot; the chosen voter casts her new ballot. Then, the voting result
is updated and publicized. The process continues in rounds until a consensus is
reached, or until the deadline is reached, the sooner of the two. We assume that
each voter has a private, strict preference order over the alternatives and that the
number of alternatives is fixed. Bargaining is not permitted. We further assume
that the voters are rational but strategic. The amount of strategic ballot changes
is unlimited and subject only to the deadline constraint. Each stage (or round) is
defined as one clock tick. Lastly, we assume that a failure to reach a consensus is
the worst outcome for all voters.
As a motivating scenario, consider an academic hiring committee. There are a
few shortlisted candidates, and each committee member has reviewed their merits,
attended their talks, and formed a preference order over the candidates, reflecting
her opinion of them. The committee has to make the decision with a large major-
ity, and has only a limited time to make its decision before the next budget period
or academic term begins. If the committee fails, the lack of a new faculty mem-
ber might have a budgetary impact, and cause a higher teaching load—the worst
outcome for everyone. The faculty’s secretary provides support for the ensuing
iterative voting procedure. He collects votes, summarizes them, and publicizes
the results to all committee members. However, the secretary can perform only a
finite, reasonable number of such steps. So if any committee member wishes to
change her vote, there is only a finite, predetermined number of opportunities she
will have to do so. Under our model, the secretary will only accept a vote change
from one committee member per iteration.
The restriction of one vote change per round is not an arbitrary design choice,
but often matches real-world needs. As a practical example, consider an event
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that occurred in the hometown of one of the authors. The town is divided into two
neighborhoods; each of the neighborhoods contains one public elementary school.
Children entering first grade are traditionally assigned to the school in their neigh-
borhood. According to Ministry of Education regulations, a class cannot contain
more than 41 children. Furthermore, schools are not allowed to voluntarily split
a class into two, if it contains fewer than 42 children. As both schools are per-
ceived as equally good, parents prefer their children to attend the school in their
own neighborhood. However, they also prefer their children to study in a class
that contains a minimal number of children. This arrangement worked for years
without any special problem, with children allocated to their neighborhood school
automatically. However, recently, 41 first grade children were allocated to one
neighborhood school and 30 children to the other. In an attempt to decrease class
sizes, and for the benefit of the young children, the town canceled the automatic
allocation and allowed parents to register their child to either one of the schools,
hoping that this would lead to either three small-sized first grade classes, or at
least two more equally-sized classes. Sadly, no registration requests were filed.
Parents assumed other parents would change their registration and were reluctant
to do so themselves, even though in hindsight, each parent regretted not chang-
ing their registration (a no-action variant on “tragedy of the commons”). Had the
town performed an iterative voting process, publicizing the current results at each
stage, and bounded by a deadline, these first graders would likely have begun their
education in less-crowded classes.
Other examples, where consensus under a deadline is required, include a jury
trial, a selection of a CEO of a company, a scientific committee deciding where to
hold next year’s conference, and even more informal problems, such as a major
holiday family dinner venue.
All the above cases have several common features. First, there is a strict dead-
line for reaching an agreement: the start of an academic year, a judge’s require-
ment, national holidays, the budget approval deadline, or dinnertime. Second, as-
suming that individuals at least somewhat differ in their preferences, it is unlikely
that a consensus will be reached immediately; a consensus is usually reached, if
at all, only after several rounds of a sequential voting process.
1.1. Contributions
We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first model for iterative voting
with a deadline (Section 2). The model can be generalized to other voting rules,
but for ease of exposition, we initiate this line of research with a specific model,
namely, Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD), based on Plurality with a threshold
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(also known as Majority). We establish the theoretical properties of CUDs, such
as termination, guarantees of no-deadlock runs, and (additive) Price of Anarchy
bounds (Section 3). CUDs adhere to a simple protocol, and we can effectively
simulate them to investigate statistical properties; we provide an encompassing
experimental analysis of their tradeoffs (Section 4). In particular, we measure the
effects of voter behavioral types (lazy vs. proactive) on the number of voting steps
and the Price of Anarchy.
Furthermore, we introduce the CUD game, an on-line voting game that we de-
signed as a user-study, in order to examine how real users behave (Section 5). The
collected data allows us to analyze human behavior such as how often a consensus
is reached, and when (if at all) strategic voting occurs; perhaps most importantly,
we also examine the quality of the final decision reached by a group of people,
in terms of the average reward and the price of anarchy. We compared our re-
sults with the performance of rational bots, and a mixture of bots and humans.
Consequently, we provide some insight into bot vs. human voting.
A short version of this paper, with preliminary results, was presented in a
workshop [1]. That version contained theorems with no proofs and no examples,
and some experimental simulations. The user-study was presented as a short con-
ference paper [2]. We include it here for the sake of completeness.
2. Model
In this section we formally model a deadline-bounded, iterative voting process.
We concentrate on an extension of the Majority rule, i.e., on plurality voting with
a threshold, leaving other voting rules for future work. The threshold can be tight,
requiring the decision to be unanimous, or relaxed, requiring a certain threshold of
the voters to agree on the decision. The formal details of our model are as follows.
The process begins when each voter reveals her most preferred alternative.
The preferences are aggregated using plurality voting. If a consensus is not in-
stantly reached, a process of vote alterations begins. More specifically, let V be a
set of n voters choosing from a set, C, of m + 1 alternatives in an iterative pro-
cess with a deadline of τ steps. At any intermediate stage of the voting process,
t ∈ [0 : τ ] will denote the remaining number of steps before the process must
stop. We denote by ψ ∈ C the default, deadlock alternative, and C+ = C \ {ψ}
the set of valid alternatives. Notice that |C+| = m. Each voter is characterised
by a truthful preference ai ∈ L(C), where L(C) is the space of complete and
non-reflexive orderings over the set of alternatives C. Generally, we write ai(c, c′)
if voter i prefers c to c′. However, when it is beneficial to visually underline the
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relative preference of two options, we will also resort to the notation c i c′. We
assume that ai(c, ψ) for all i ∈ V and c ∈ C+, i.e., the deadlock alternative is the
worst option from the point of view of all voters. At the beginning of the process,
when t = τ , every voter i ∈ V casts a ballot bti ∈ C that reveals her most pre-
ferred candidate. The collection of all ballots, bt = (bt1, . . . , b
t
n) ∈ Cn, is a ballot
profile. Given a ballot profile, the score of each candidate is the sum of votes for
this candidate: scc(bt) = |{i|bti = c}| ∈ N .
A score vector is a collection of scores of all valid candidates sc(bt) =
(sc1(b
t), . . . , scm(b
t)) ∈ Nm. For convenience, a shorthand st = (st1, . . . , stm) =
sc(bt) is used, and we omit the time superscript to denote an arbitrary score vec-
tor. The score vector is public knowledge to all voters.
Possible outcomes at time t are computed using a Multi-stage Defaulted Voting
Rule (MDVR), that estimates whether any non-default candidates have enough
time to gather sufficient support to cross the majority threshold. MDVR explicitly
focuses on iterative ballot modifications, and accounts for the possibility that the
score of a candidate may change. Formally, an MDVR, denoted F , maps a score
vector at time t to a subset of all candidates (including the default option), and has
the form F : ∆× [0 : τ ]→ 2C , where ∆ is the space of all feasible score vectors.
In this paper we investigate two MDVRs: the Iterative Majority (IMaj), and
its special sub-case, Iterative Unanimity (IUn). In the following we will assume
that a majority threshold is σ > n
2
, and naturally extend this to the unanimous
threshold of σ = n. Let Ŵ ⊆ C+ denote the set of all valid candidates whose
score difference from the winning majority threshold is bounded by the time until
the deadline. That is: Ŵ (s, t) = {c ∈ C+ | σ − sc < t+ 1}. Intuitively, these
are the candidates that may still gather winning support if enough voters begin to
favour them within the remaining time until the deadline. Throughout the paper
we will term Ŵ = Ŵ (s, t) the set of possible winners.1 Notice that the time
index t here means that this set is calculated after voters have expressed their vote
alterations at time-slice t. Thus the rule of IMaj is defined as:
F IMajσ (s, t) =
{
{ψ} Ŵ = ∅
Ŵ otherwise
Once the deadline is reached, F(s, 0) is a singleton containing either (i) a
1Note the difference from the classical concept of possible winners, which refers to expansions
of partial preference ballots (see e.g., [3]).
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valid candidate with the highest score (the winner), or (ii) the default candidate
ψ (deadlock). Notice that the MDVR for Iterative Unanimity is F IUn = F IMajn .
Once the set of possible outcomes is computed, at any given time t ∈ [0 : τ ],
the voter decides whether to change her vote and produce a ballot bti ∈ C, i.e.,
state her vote at time t. We assume that all voters are selfish and myopic. As a
result, if the set of possible outcomes includes more than one valid candidate, a
voter will always seek to support her most-preferred among them. Hereafter, we
assume that all voters myopically seek to maximise their utility.
The voter’s best possible outcome: For any non-empty W ⊂ C the best
alternative inW w.r.t. the voter’s truthful preferences ai is denoted topi(W ) ∈ W .
That is, w is the best possible outcome for voter i if voter i prefers it over any
other candidate in the possible outcome set: w = topi(W ) if and only if for all
c ∈ W \ {w} holds ai(w, c).
The voter’s utility function: Each voter has a utility function that matches a
score vector at time t to the voter’s utility: ui : ∆× [0 : τ ]→ R. We assume that
the utility function is consistent with the voter’s truthful preferences ai for any
t ∈ τ . We will particularly emphasise the classes of lazy consistent and proactive
consistent utility functions. Intuitively, a lazy consistent utility function drives the
voter to change her ballot only if a better alternative can be injected into the set of
possible outcomes, while a proactive consistent function would also induce ballot
change if the score of the best possible outcome can be improved. Formally, these
utility classes are defined as follows.
Definition 1. A utility function ui is lazy consistent if for all s, s′ ∈ ∆ and t ∈ [0 :
τ ] the following condition holds:
ui(s, t) > ui(s
′, t) ⇐⇒ ai(w,w′),
where w = topi(F(s, t)) and w′ = topi(F(s′, t)).
Definition 2. A utility function ui is proactive consistent if for all s, s′ ∈ ∆ and
t ∈ [0 : τ ] holds the condition that:
ui(s, t) > ui(s
′, t) ⇐⇒ ai(w,w′) ∨ ((w = w′) ∧ (sw > s′w))
where w = topi(F(s, t)) and w′ = topi(F(s′, t)).
We further assume that all utility functions are homogeneously either lazy con-
sistent or proactive consistent. Notice that, although here we only use F IMaj and
F IUn, CUDs can be naturally extended to more general forms of MDVRs. It is
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also important to note that the use of cardinal utilities has some formal benefits.
Although it is possible to describe both lazy and proactive voter behaviour using
only ordinal preferences, that leads to formal descriptions of choosing the best
course of actions, or of reasoning about preference alterations, becoming vividly
distinct for the two behaviours. The use of utilities allows us to avoid this compli-
cation, creating an elegant, uniform formal treatment of our model under various
voter behaviour characteristics.
Now, it must be noted that for F IMaj and F IUn the definitions of lazy and
proactive utilities do not differ in their behaviour if F(s, t) = {ψ}. That is, once
MDVR provides the default as the only possible outcome, neither lazy nor proac-
tive behaviour dictates any change. Therefore, we concentrate our discussion on
the effect of these behaviours in those cases where F(s, t) ⊆ C+, that is the rule
produces a set of possible winners Ŵ 6= ∅ as its set of possibe outcomes. In fact,
the proof of Theorem 1 will later show that strategic considerations by voters can
only be effective in those cases where F(s, t) ⊆ C+ and a possible winner set Ŵ
is involved.
The following example illustrates the voting procedure.
Example 1. Voting model.
Let there be three voters, V = {1, 2, 3} and three alternatives C+ = {a, b, c}.
Assume the strictest voting rule, unanimity, i.e., σ = n. The time until the deadline
is τ = 2; the voters are required to reach a consensus in three time periods,
from time t = τ until t = 0. Assume that the three voters have the following
preferences:
voter 1: a 1 b 1 c;
voter 2: b 2 c 2 a;
voter 3: c 3 a 3 b.
Stage t = 2. The voters cast their ballots and reveal their (truthful) most
preferred alternative, bτ = (bτ1, b
τ
2, b
τ
3) = (a, b, c). Thus the scores are s
2 =
(s2a, s
2
b , s
2
c) = (1, 1, 1).
In order to win, an alternative must receive all σ = 3 votes. At the moment
each alternative has only one vote. There are two stages ahead, hence any alter-
native can gather the two remaining votes. Therefore at this stage all the three
alternatives {a, b, c} are possible winners, Ŵ (s2, 2) = {a, b, c}.
Stage t = 1. Each voter decides whether she wishes to change her vote. Note
that the voters consider their options before they know if they will be chosen to cast
their ballots. This can be viewed as answering the question: “what will I vote if
I am picked to vote?”. Each voter asks herself this question and decides whether
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she wishes to have a possibility to change her ballot. In the current example, the
voters know that someone must change the ballot, or else the deadlock alternative
will be chosen (and deadlock is the worst outcome for all voters). The voter does
not know if the other voters will agree to change their ballot, and since she wishes
to avoid the deadlock alternative from being chosen, she will agree to change her
ballot.
For instance, consider voter 1. She has 3 possible actions: either she stays
with a (b11 = a), or she changes to b or c (b
1
1 = b or b
1
1 = c). If she declares that
she wishes to change, she might be randomly picked to do so. In this case, if she
is picked to change at the current stage, she can predict the consequences of each
of these possible votes, as Table 1 illustrates.
If she decides to keep her vote for a (row 2 of Table 1), then the scores of the
alternatives will be sc(b1) = (s1a, s
1
b , s
1
c) = (1, 1, 1) and there will be no possible
winner, because n− s1x ≥ τ − 1 + 1 for any alternative x ∈ C.
If voter 1 decides to change her ballot, and instead of voting a she votes b
(row 3 of Table 1), the scores are sc(b1) = (s1a, s
1
b , s
1
c) = (0, 2, 1). Since n− sb ≤
τ − 1 + 1, alternative b is a possible winner.
Table 1: Possible decisions of voter 1 at stage t = 1.
Voters b1i (s
1
a, s
1
b , s
1
c) Ŵ (s
1, 1)
voter 1 a (1,1,1) {}
b (0,2,1) {b} ← prefers to switch to b
c (0,1,2) {c}
voter 2 a (2,0,1) {a}
b (1,1,1) {}
c (1,0,2) {c} ← prefers to switch to c
voter 3 a (2,1,0) {a} ← prefers to switch to a
b (1,2,0) {b}
c (1,1,1) {}
If at this stage voter 1 decides to switch to c (row 4 of Table 1), then the scores
are (sτ−1a , s
τ−1
b , s
τ−1
c ) = (0, 1, 2), and c would be a possible winner. Since the
utility function is consistent with the truthful preference, voter 1 prefers to switch
to b. This is true both for lazy consistent and proactive voters.
The same argument can be applied to voters 2 and 3. Therefore, all three
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voters “raise their hands” and wish to change their votes. Possible changes are
gathered in Table 1.
Assume that voter 1 is randomly picked to change her vote. Accordingly, b1 =
(b11, b
1
2, b
1
3) = (b, b, c) and s
1 = (s1a, s
1
b , s
1
c) = (0, 2, 1), which makes b the only
possible winner.
Stage t = 0. Voters 1 and 2 have no reason to change their vote since, as
is shown in Table 2, whatever they vote, they cannot be better off. Voter 3 can
be better off by switching to b, as is illustrated in Table 2 since, if she votes for
b, the ballot would be b0 = (b01, b
0
2, b
0
3) = (b, b, b) and the scores would be s
0 =
(s0a, s
0
b , s
0
c) = (0, 3, 0), which makes b the only possible winner. Consequently,
voter 3 decides to change her vote from c to b. Since she is the only one who
wishes to change (that is, she is the only possible voter to be randomly picked),
she changes to b.
Table 2: Possible decisions of voters 1 and 2 at stage t = 0.
Voters b0i (s
0
a, s
0
b , s
0
c) Ŵ (s
0, 0)
voter 1 a (1,1,1) {}
b (0,2,1) {}
c (0,1,2) {}
voter 2 a (1,1,1) {}
b (0,2,1) {}
c (0,1,2) {}
voter 3 a (1,2,0) {}
b (0,3,0) {b} ← prefers to switch to b
c (0,2,1) {}
After voter 3 changes her vote, the voting ballot is b1 = (b, b, b) and s1 =
(0, 3, 0). Since sb = σ = n, alternative b is chosen as the winner.
The behaviours of lazy and proactive voters are different with respect to the
stage at which they decide to change, and to which alternative they switch. The
difference is illustrated by the following two examples for both voter types.
Example 2. Behaviour of lazy voters.
There are five lazy voters, V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and there are four alternatives
to be voted for, C+ = {a, b, c, d}. Assume unanimity, σ = n = 5 and that the
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voters need to reach a consensus in five time periods, τ = 4. Assume that voters
have the following preferences:
voter 1: a 1 b 1 c 1 d;
voter 2: a 2 c 2 b 2 d
voter 3: b 3 c 3 a 3 d;
voter 4: b 4 a 4 c 4 d;
voter 5: c 5 b 5 d 5 a
Stage t = 4. The voters reveal their truthfully most preferred alternative,
hence, the voting ballot is b4 = (b41, b
4
2, b
4
3, b
4
4, b
4
5) = (a, a, b, b, c) and, therefore, the
scores are s5 = (s4a, s
4
b , s
4
c , s
4
d) = (2, 2, 1, 0). The possible winners are Ŵ (s
4, 4) =
{a, b, c}.
Stage t = 3. Each voter needs to decide whether she wishes to change her
vote. Voters 1–4 cannot be better off if they change their vote, since any change
would exclude their top-choice from the set of possible winners. Therefore, they
do not “raise their hands” in order to change their votes. This is illustrated in
Table 3.
Consider voter 5. Whatever she votes, the set of possible winners consists only
of a and b as is illustrated in Table 3. Hence, by Definition 1 voter 5, being a lazy
voter, prefers not to change her vote.
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Table 3: Possible decisions of voters at stage t = 3.
Voters b3i s
3 Ŵ (s3, 3)
voter 1 a (2,2,1,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
b (1,3,1,0) {b}
c (1,2,2,0) {b, c}
d (1,2,1,1) {b}
voter 2 a (2,2,1,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
b (1,3,1,0) {b}
c (1,2,2,0) {b, c}
d (1,2,1,1) {b}
voter 3 a (3,1,1,0) {a}
b (2,2,1,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
c (2,1,2,0) {a, c}
d (2,1,1,1) {a}
voter 4 a (3,1,1,0) {a}
b (2,2,1,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
c (2,1,2,0) {a, c}
d (2,1,1,1) {a}
voter 5 a (3,2,0,0) {a, b}
b (2,3,0,0) {a, b}
c (2,2,1,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
d (2,2,0,1) {a, b}
Hence, at stage t = 3 the ballot is b3 = (b31, b
3
2, b
3
3, b
3
4, b
3
5) = (a, a, b, b, c), and
alternatives’ scores are s3 = (s3a, s
3
b , s
3
c , s
3
d) = (2, 2, 1, 0), which make alterna-
tives a and b the only possible winners at the current stage.
Example 3. Behaviour of Proactive voters.
Consider the same voters and preferences as in the previous example. When
the voters are proactive the result at stage t = 4 does not change; the possible
winners are Ŵ (s4, 4) = {a, b, c}.
At stage t = 3 voters 1–4 cannot be better off if they change their vote, as is
illustrated in Table 3.
Consider voter 5. As is illustrated in Table 4, whatever she votes, the set of
possible winners will be {a, b}. Since she is a proactive voter, then, by Definition
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2, given that she prefers b to a, she “raises her hand” because she can be better
off by voting for b. Being the only voter who wants to cast a ballot at the current
stage, she is picked to change it.
Table 4: Possible decisions of voter 5 at stage t = 3.
Voters b3i s
3 Ŵ (s3, 3)
voter 5 a (3,2,0,0) {a, b}
b (2,3,0,0) {a, b} ← prefers not to change
c (2,2,1,0) {a, b}
d (2,2,0,1) {a, b}
Hence, at stage t = 3 the ballot is b3 = (b31, b
3
2, b
3
3, b
3
4, b
3
5) = (a, a, b, b, b), and
alternatives have scores s3 = (s3a, s
3
b , s
3
c , s
3
d) = (2, 3, 0, 0), which makes alterna-
tive b the only possible winner.
Having constructed some procedural intuition with Examples 1 and 3, we can
now summarise the progress of a CUD in a protocoled manner. Formally, a CUD
iterative voting game proceeds as depicted in Protocol 1. Since score vectors
simply accumulate ballots from bt, we use algebraic operations between a score
vector and a ballot. That is, if s′ = s − c (respectively, s = s + c) then s′k = sk
for all k ∈ C \ {c} and s′c = sc − 1 (respectively, s′c = sc + 1). In other words,
“adding” a candidate to a score vector increases the score of that candidate by 1,
while “subtracting” the candidate reduces it by 1.
Protocol 1 is parameterised by the Multi-stage Defaulted Voting Rule F and
the deadline τ . The game, therefore, proceeds as follows. Iteratively, as long as the
deadline has not been reached: all voters calculate the current score vector (line
3). If there is only one possible winner, w, a decision has been reached and the
game ends (lines 4–5). If the game continues, every voter calculates what is her
best possible winner, given that the current score vector would be augmented by
her vote alteration (line 7–8). If there are ties (i.e., if a few alternatives receive the
same score), the voter selects the alternative that is ranked highest in her truthful
preferences ai. Each voter decides whether she wants to change her vote, based
on the possible winner set and her utility function. Voters who want to vote “raise
their hands”, i.e., are collected into a set I (line 10). A random voter is chosen
from set I (line 11). The chosen voter casts her ballot (lines 12–15), and the
deadline is now one step closer (line 16).
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Now, at first it may appear that Protocol 1 is unstable, and time can run out
with more than one alternative remaining a possible winner. However, Theorem 1
shows that a CUD always terminates with a single alternative in C declared a
winner. We distinguish between two ways a CUD can terminate. We say that
a CUD has converged, if it terminates with a w ∈ C+ declared as the winner;
otherwise, a deadlock occurred.
Game Protocol 1 Consensus Under Deadline, CUD(F , τ)
Input: MDVR F , deadline timeout τ
Input: Set of voters V , set of alternatives C,
Input: Truthful profile a, and utilities ui.
Initialise: Set t← τ , and bτi ← topi(C) for all i ∈ V
1: while t ≥ 0 do
2: Ballots bti are declared
3: All voters calculate st = sc(bt)
4: if F(st, t) = {w} for some w ∈ C then
5: return w as the winner . Game stops
6: end if
7: for i ∈ V do
8: wi ← arg max
c∈C
ui(s
t − bti + c, t− 1) . Ties are broken by ai
9: end for
10: I ← {i ∈ V |wi 6= bti}
11: j ← Random(I) . Random voter choice
12: for i ∈ V do
13: bt−1i ← bti
14: end for
15: bt−1j = wj . Only j is allowed to re-vote
16: t← t− 1
17: end while
2.1. Quality of CUD outcomes
In order to analyse the quality of the result of a CUD game, features of vot-
ing processes can be adapted. One such feature is the Additive Price of Anarchy
(PoA) [4]. We adapt the additive PoA to CUDs, requiring that at least some valid
alternative can become a winner, as follows.
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Definition 3. Let a be the truthful profile of voters participating in a CUD, b a
ballot profile induced by a (i.e., bi = topi(C)), and s = sc(b). Denote all valid
candidates that the CUD may converge to by Ĉ ⊆ C+. Then the CUD’s additive
Price of Anarchy is
PoA+(a) = max
c∈C
sc −min
c∈Ĉ
sc
Namely, Additive PoA is the score of the least-preferred valid alternative that
could become the winner of a CUD, subtracted from the score of the truthful
winner. Notice that PoA is well defined only for games where Ĉ is not empty,
i.e., there is at least one non-trivial conclusion to the voting process.2
3. Theoretical Features of CUD
We begin our theoretical analysis by showing that the CUD Protocol is stable,
i.e., Protocol 1 always terminates at line 5, rather than simply running out of time.
Please notice that in all our proofs time appears to be running backwards, as we
measure the number of steps until the deadline. Thus, with every decision step
taken by voters, time winds down from t = τ to t = 0.
Theorem 1. In any CUD(F IMajσ , τ) with σ ∈ (n2 , n] and consistent utility func-
tions, either a deadlock occurs at t = 0, or a valid alternative becomes the winner
at time t ∈ [0 : τ ].
Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that if there are possible winners at the
beginning of the process, then the process converges with some valid alternative
as a winner. This implies that at stage τ the set of possible winners is not empty,
nor is it empty at the final stage 0, since there is a winner. Suppose that it does
not hold: the process does not converge, even if there were possible winners at
the beginning. In other words, at the final step t = 0 the set of possible winners
is empty, although at the initial step t = τ it is not empty. This can happen if, at
some time step between the beginning at t = τ and the end at t = 0, the set of
possible winners becomes empty (including the time step t = 0). Consider the
time step τ ′, such that for all τ ′′ > τ ′ the set of possible winners is not empty,
while for τ ′ it is empty.
2Here we follow well-established definitions of the Price of Anarchy for voting processes with
restricted dynamics, see e.g., [4, 5].
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Consider the preceding iteration of our game protocol, i.e., the time step τ ′+1.
There are two possible scenarios: (i) no voter changes the vote, and (ii) some voter
changes the vote.
First, assume that at the time step τ ′ + 1 there are no voters who wish to
change their votes. Since at τ ′ + 1 the set of possible winners is not empty, for
all the voters the utility is not zero under the current strategy. Since their utility at
time τ ′ + 1 reflects the outcome of time τ ′, the set of possible winners could not
become empty at time step τ ′.
Second, if the second scenario has occurred, at the time step τ ′ + 1 there are
some voters who do change their vote. The only reason for a voter to change
his vote is to improve his utility by switching away from an alternative that is
either no longer in the set of possible winners, or will be removed from the set
at the next time-slice. Such a switch, however, necessitates that the voter’s newly
chosen alternative remains in the set of possible winners at the next time-slice.
Otherwise, the voter’s utility from this new choice would not be positive, and no
decision switch would occur. In particular, this implies that the set of possible
winners is not empty. The obtained contradiction proves that if the set of possible
winners is not empty at τ , it cannot become empty at 0, therefore there is a valid
alternative that is declared as a winner.
What remains is to show consistency of our protocol, i.e., that if at the time
step τ the set of possible winners is empty, it must be empty at the time step 0 as
well. Denote c ∈ C+ an alternative that at time step τ has the maximum score sc
among all other alternatives. Since the set of possible winners is empty at the time
step τ , it implies that σ − sc ≥ τ + 1. Even if at each step until the deadline there
will be a voter that changes his vote for this alternative c, at time 0 this alternative
will have obtained only τ more votes. As a result, the score of the alternative c
at time step 0 can be at most sc + τ , which would imply that σ − sc − τ ≥ 1
and c 6∈ Ŵ (s, 0). As the score of c is maximal possible at time t = τ , the same
holds for all other alternatives. Hence, no alternative is a member of Ŵ (s, 0)—it
is empty.
Notice that Theorem 1 applies to both voter types of interest, lazy and proac-
tive. In fact, all of our theoretical results are applicable to both of these types.
Now, having established that the algorithm always controllably stops, we can
study the CUD process in detail. First, we show that if a candidate is not a possi-
ble winner at stage t (e.g., now), then he will never become a possible winner at
any further stage t+ i.
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Lemma 1. Let c /∈ Ŵ at step t, then c /∈ Ŵ at any step t′ < t.
Proof. Given that stc < σ − t and at each step the candidate c can get at most one
vote, then st′c < s
t
c + (t− t′) < σ− t+ (t− t′) = σ− t′ for any t′ < t. Therefore,
c /∈ Ŵ at step t′.
The next lemma suggests that a candidate that receives an additional vote from
one time step to the next must be in the set of possible winners.
Lemma 2. If st+1c < stc, then c ∈ Ŵ (st, t).
Proof. Given that st+1c < s
t
c, there exists a voter, i, who changed his vote in favor
of c at time step t. Let c′ denote a candidate that he voted for at the preceding time
step t+ 1, and let us assume that the the lemma’s conclusion does not hold. That
is, that assume that c /∈ Ŵ (st, t).
Notice that, except c, no candidate increased their score from the time step
t + 1 to the time step t. This is because only one voter was given the chance to
change their vote, and thus st = st+1− c′+ c. As a result, Ŵ (st+1, t) ⊇ Ŵ (st, t).
Therefore, either (but not both) of the following holds:
• ai(topi(Ŵ (st+1, t)), topi(Ŵ (st, t)))
• topi(Ŵ (st+1, t)) = topi(Ŵ (st, t)).
A voter changes his vote only if it increases his utility, and conditions above
indicate that a lazy voter’s utility (Definition 1) will not change between st+1 and
st. Thus, voter i can not be a lazy voter.
Now, combining the fact that st = st+1 − c′ + c with our attempt to assume
that c /∈ Ŵ (st, t), we conclude that no candidate in the set Ŵ (st, t) has a score
higher that it has in st+1. More formally, ∀ĉ ∈ Ŵ (st, t), stĉ ≤ st+1ĉ . As a result,
switching from c′ to cwould not have been the preferred move of a proactive voter
(Definition 2), as it does not change the utility of the set of possible outcomes.
We conclude that if the set of voters consists of lazy and/or proactive voters,
then the assumption c /∈ Ŵ (st, t) leads to a contradiction of no voter having an
incentive to change their vote. Thus, c ∈ Ŵ (st, t) must hold.
The next two lemmas prove that a voter always votes for her top choice in the
set of possible winners; and, if a voter switches her support to another candidate,
then this newly supported candidate has at least the same score (number of votes)
as the previously supported candidate.
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Lemma 3. If a voter j at the time step t votes for candidate c ∈ Ŵ (st, t), then
c = topi(Ŵ (s
t, t)).
Proof. First notice that all voters initially vote for their top choice, thus the lemma’s
conclusion holds for t = τ . However, let us assume, to the contrary, that the
lemma does not hold in general. In particular, it would imply that there is a time
step t such that for any t′ > t (i.e., preceding steps) the statement of the lemma is
fulfilled, and at step t there is a voter j such that: (i) he votes for c ∈ Ŵ (st, t); (ii)
there is a candidate c′ j c in the set Ŵ (st, t).
Lemma 1 implies that Ŵ (st, t) ⊆ Ŵ (st+1, t + 1). If voter j did not change
his vote at time t, then by maximality of t holds c = topi ∈ Ŵ (st+1, t + 1) and
it implies that c = topi ∈ Ŵ (st, t), which we assumed not to hold. Thus, j must
have changed his vote at time step t. However, since there is c′ j c in the set
Ŵ (st, t), both lazy and proactive consistent utility (see Definitions 1, 2) from c is
lower than it is from c′ at time step t, which contradicts optimality of choice in
voting decisions (see Game Protocol 1, line 8).
Lemma 4. If there is a voter that changes his ballot at time t from voting for c to
voting for c′, then st+1c ≤ st+1c′ .
Proof. Let us assume the opposite to the lemma’s conclusion, that is st+1c > s
t+1
c′
and consequently, st+1c ≥ st+1c′ + 1 = stc′ . As a result, according to Lemma 2,
c′ ∈ Ŵ (st, t). However, since stc′ is sufficient to become a possible winner at time
t and st+1c ≥ stc′ , holds that c ∈ Ŵ (st+1, t). Note that, accoring to Lemma 1, the
above implies that c, c′ ∈ Ŵ (st+1, t+ 1).
Now, Lemma 3 implies that if a voter votes for a candidate in the set Ŵ (st+1, t+
1), then he prefers this candidate over all other possible winners. Therefore, sim-
ilarly to the proof of lemma 2, neither a lazy nor a proactive voter would change
their votes. The obtained contradiction proves the lemma.
Now we can place a condition on the game features that ensure that a deadlock
does not occur.
Corollary 1. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) be the truthful profile, let τ be the deadline
time, and let b be the ballot profile induced by a, i.e., bi = topi(C). CUD
stops with some w ∈ C+ if and only if there is an alternative c ∈ C+ so that
scc(b) ≥ σ − τ .
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Proof. First, let us assume the right-hand side of the “if and only if” statement,
and show that CUD stops with a non-default alternative. The condition scc(b) ≥
σ − τ implies that c is a possible winner by the definition of Ŵ (b, τ). Thus, at
time step t = τ the set of possible winners contains at least one alternative. As a
result, by Theorem 1, the process converges with some (non-default) alternative
chosen as the winner.
Now, let us deal with the opposite direction of the Theorem’s implication. Let
CUD stop with some w ∈ C+. Then this candidate w achieved σ votes in no more
than τ steps. At each step he could get 1 vote at most, that is, he achieved no more
than τ votes. Thus, for the initial score of w it must hold that scw(b) ≥ σ−τ .
Corollary 1 essentially provides a finer bound on what the initial scores must
look like, so that CUD converges. Intuitively, it says that for a non-deadlock
alternative to become the declared winner, there must be enough time for it to
gather additional support to achieve the majority threshold. However, Corollary 1
does not guarantee that a particular alternative will be declared as the winner. For
such a guarantee, a much more stringent condition must be required of τ and n,
as the following theorem states.
Theorem 2. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) be the truthful profile, let τ be the deadline
time, and let b be the ballot profile induced by a, i.e., bi = topi(C)). If there is an
alternative c ∈ C+ so that scc(b) ≥ max
{⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1, σ − τ} then CUD terminates
with c as the winner.
Proof. Note that at any step such that all voters whose top-choice is candidate c,
vote for c, for any other candidate it is true that stc′ ≤ n−stc ≤
⌊
n
2
⌋
and stc′ ≤ stc−1.
Thus, if CUD terminates with a winner other than c, it implies that c loses
some votes of those whose top-choice is c.
Consider t such that for every t′ ≥ t all voters whose top-choice is c vote for
c and at step t one of them changes his vote to c′. Thus, given that no one of them
has changed their vote before, stc′ < s
t
c which contradicts Lemma 4. That is, there
is no such t.
Therefore, candidate c retains the same number of votes, scτc , until step 0,
which implies that at that last step he has more votes than any other candidate.
The following example demonstrates that the bound of Theorem 2 is tight.
That is, if the score were any lower than Theorem 2 suggests, then, for at least
some truthful profiles, a CUD would have more than one alternative that could be
declared the winner.
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Example 4. Let the number of voters n be even, and the number of (non-default)
alternatives m ≥ 2. Furthermore, assume that τ > n
2
. Construct the truthful
profile a so that topi(C) =
{
c1 i ∈ [1 : n2 ]
c2 i ∈ [n2 + 1 : n]
, where c1, c2 ∈ C+. All other
non-default candidates may appear in ai in any order. Then, both c1 and c2 can
possibly be declared as the winner in a CUD.
Having dealt with the characterisation of valid alternatives that are either guar-
anteed to, or can potentially, be declared a winner, we can exploit this knowledge
to place some bounds on the additive Price of Anarchy for CUDs.
Theorem 3. Let a be the truthful profile of voters participating in a CUD. As-
suming that it is well-defined for the CUD instance, the following bounds can be
placed on the additive Price of Anarchy, PoA+, depending on the ratio of the
deadline timeout τ and the number of voters n:
1. If τ ≤ σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
, then
PoA+(a) = 0. (1)
2. If σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
< τ < σ, then
PoA+(a) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ. (2)
3. If τ ≥ σ, then
PoA+(a) ≤
⌊n
2
⌋
− 1. (3)
Proof. Case when τ ≤ σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
.
Note that, even if at each step every voter would change his vote in favour of
the same alternative c, this alternative c would get no more than τ points.
sτc + τ ≥ σ ⇔ sτc ≥ σ − τ ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
Note that, there can be at most two alternatives with score
⌊
n
2
⌋
. If c is the
only one, then he is the winner, hence PoA+(a) = 0. Suppose there are two
such alternatives: w and c. If they have equal scores at τ : sτw = s
τ
c =
⌊
n
2
⌋
,
then, whoever wins, PoA+(a) = 0. Another possibility is that there are two such
alternatives, w and c, such that w has more points, i.e., sτw = s
τ
c + 1, and all other
alternatives have 0 points. Alternative c would win only if every supporter of w
would change to c, which would take all τ stages. But, from those who initially
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voted for w, no voter would change his vote to c, since they are better off by
keeping their votes for w. Hence, w will win, and consequently, PoA+(a) = 0.
Case when σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
< τ < σ
Let ω denote the plurality winner at the time step t = τ and c denote the
winner at the time step t = 0, and let us assume the contrary to the Theorem, i.e.,
PoA+(a) >
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ. In particular, it would mean that ω 6= c and
stω − stc >
⌊n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ (4)
In τ steps candidate c obtains at most τ votes and becomes a winner, that is stc +
τ ≥ σ. Therefore, stc ≥ σ − τ . Combining this with Equation 4, we obtain:
stω >
⌊n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ + stc ≥
⌊n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ + σ − τ =
⌊n
2
⌋
Thus, stω >
⌊
n
2
⌋
and, consequently, stω ≥
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1. However, according to
Theorem 2, this means that ω is the declared winner of the CUD at time step
t = 0. Which contradicts key part of our assumption: c 6= ω. We thus must
conclude that PoA+(a) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋
+ τ − σ, as is per the Theorem.
Case τ ≥ σ.
Notice again that if PoA+ 6= 0 then the winner at the time step t = τ (denoted
by ω) and the winner at the time step t = 0 (denoted by c) must be different. Now,
Theorem 2 implies that at the time step t = τ the truthful profile winner, ω, can
have at most
⌊
n
2
⌋
votes, otherwise it must be the winner at the time step t = 0 as
well.
At the same time, it must be that sτc ≥ 1. Otherwise, no voter would be able
to switch to c at any time, as there will be at least one other candidate with a
higher score than c (the current winner) and, thus, Lemma 4 would prevent the
switch. Since possible winners never lose votes, but only gain them, which means
that the score of c will never drop to zero either. Thus, PoA+(a) ≤ ⌊n
2
⌋ − 1, as
required.
Lemma 5. The last two bounds in Theorem 3 are tight. For all τ and n that satisfy
the conditions of Equations 2 and 3, there exists a truthful profile a such that the
corresponding bound holds as an equality.
Proof. Table 5 provides an example of a voting profile that proves that the bounds
in Case 2 (σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
< τ < σ) of Theorem 3 are tight. All voters are grouped into
3 Blocks. Voters in Block-1 prefer the candidate c over c1 and over all other can-
didates; voters in Block-2 prefer candidate ω over c and over all other candidates;
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finally, each voter in Block-3 prefers some distinct candidate (but not ω) over c
and over all other candidates. Assume that there are σ − τ voters in Block-1, ⌊n
2
⌋
voters in Block-2, and the rest of the voters are in Block-3. It is assumed that
σ − τ ≥ 2, so, there are at least 2 voters in Block-1.
Table 5: Proof of Lemma 5: voters’ preferences
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
(σ − τ voters) (⌊n
2
⌋
voters) (The rest of the voters)
c c ... c w w ... w c1 c2 ... ck
c1 c1 ... c1 c c ... c c c ... c
All other candidates in any order All other candidates in any order All other candidates in any order
Notice that we can indeed construct such a preference profile given that σ −⌊
n
2
⌋
< τ , that is, σ− τ < ⌊n
2
⌋
. In particular, the size of Block-3 is k = n− ⌊n
2
⌋−
σ + τ , and, therefore, every candidate from {c1, c2, ...ck} appears as a top-choice
only once.
Assume that σ − τ ≥ 2 and n is odd. Then, Ŵ (sτ , τ) = {c, w}. Thus, at any
time step prior to σ − ⌊n
2
⌋
voters from the Block-3 will want to change their vote
to c, since they currently vote for a candidate outside the set of possible winner
Ŵ and for all of these voters c  w. No candidate from Block-1 or Block-2 will
want to change their votes during that time.
As a result, for t =
⌊
n
2
⌋−σ+τ holds stc = stw = ⌊n2⌋. After this step all voters
from Block 1 and all except one from Block 3 vote for c, and all the voters from
Block 2 vote for w. At the next step, t− 1, all the voters will want to change their
vote since the set of possible winners Ŵ (st−1, t− 1) can only contain candidates
with
⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1 votes.
Ties among voters who wish to change their vote are broken randomly, and
with probability b
n
2 c+1
n
a voter will be chosen who will change her vote to c.
This will make c the only possible winner, which, more formally, means that
Ŵ (sbn2 c−σ+τ−1, ⌊n
2
⌋ − σ + τ − 1) = {c}. Hence, c will be the winner of the
entire election process, the final winner. Given that c and w are the only possible
winners, and w is a Plurality winner at time τ , PoA+ =
⌊
n
2
⌋− σ + τ .
Table 6 provides an example of a voting profile that proves that the bounds in
the Case 3 (τ ≥ σ) of Theorem 3 are tight.
Once again, all voters are grouped into three blocks. Voters of Block-1 prefer
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candidate ω over c and over all other candidates; Block-2 voters prefer candidate c
over c1 and over all other candidates; each voter in Block-3 prefers some distinct
candidate (but not ω) over candidate c and other candidates. Let there be
⌊
n
2
⌋
voters in Block-1, a single voter in Block-2, and the rest of the voters grouped
into Block-3. We will assume that n is odd, so that the number of voters in Block-
3 is k =
⌊
n
2
⌋
.
Table 6: Proof of Lemma 5: voters’ preferences – point of ref
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
(
⌊
n
2
⌋
voters) (1 voter) (The rest of the voters)
w w ... w c c1 c2 ... ck
c c ... c c1 c c ... c
Now, notice that at the time step t = σ − 1 voters from Block-2 and Block-
3 will want to change their vote. In particular, voters from Block-3 will want
to change their votes to c, and, because ties among willing voters are broken uni-
formly at random, with probability b
n
2 c
bn2 c+1 a voter from Block-3 will be granted the
opportunity and change her vote in favour of c. Thus, Ŵ (sτ−1, τ − 1) = {w, c}.
Analogously to the previously investigated profile, both w and c can be the final
winner. Hence, PoA+ ≥ ⌊n
2
⌋− 1.
4. Experimental Features of CUD
We evaluated the behaviour of lazy and proactive voters on four real-world
data sets: the Sushi data set (5000 voters, 10 candidates) [6], the T-shirt data set
(30 voters, 11 candidates), the Courses 2003 data set (146 voters, 8 candidates)
and the Courses 2004 data set (153 voters, 7 candidates). The three latter data sets
are taken from the Preflib library [7]. For a fixed number of n (n = 10, 20 or 30)
voters, we varied the deadline length τ . For each experimental setting, we created
20 random sets of voter profiles by sampling with return from each data set. For
each set of voter profiles, the experiment was conducted 30,000 times.
We examined:
• The time until convergence, i.e., the time when all games converge for a
22
given sub-class of experiment (e.g., all experiments of games with 10 voters,
or 7 candidates).
• How many changes in votes are required for the process to converge.
• The Additive Price of Anarchy for a process that has converged (Defini-
tion 3).
Our theoretical results are relevant for all majority thresholds σ ∈ (n
2
, n].
However, to investigate the finer features of CUDs, we concentrate on Unanimity,
fixing σ to the number of voters n. Even though it means that we experimentally
study an extreme CUD case, fixing σ allows us to exclude it as a free parameter,
and concentrate on studying more complex game features, such as the Additive
Price of Anarchy.
In order to conclude which voter type performs best over multiple data sets,
we followed a robust non-parametric procedure proposed by [8]. This procedure
allows us to avoid the assumption that the performance difference between voter
types is normally distributed, making it more adequate than the standard t-test. We
first used the Friedman Aligned Ranks test in order to reject the null hypothesis
that all voter types perform the same. This was followed by the Bonferroni-Dunn
test to find whether one of the types performs significantly better than the other.
4.1. Simulation Results
Convergence: As Theorem 1 indicates, convergence always occurs when
there is enough time until the deadline to allow voters to change their vote (i.e.,
when the number of iterations is larger than the number of voters). Interestingly,
we find that in all experimental settings the process converges faster than the
worst-case convergence time, described by Theorem 1. This suggests that real-
world voter preferences are a priori aligned, in a sense, and it is easier to reach
consensus than with an arbitrary preference profile. Table 7 shows the time twhen
all experiments converge. Each column represents a different number of voters,
and each row a different data set. The number of candidates in the data set is
indicated in brackets. For example, for the Courses 2004 data set (row 2), for
10 voters (column 2), all of the experiments converge when the deadline τ ≥ 6.
The process seems to begin to converge faster when there are fewer candidates.
The exact impact of the candidate number on convergence should be examined
on a wider variety of data sets; we leave this for future research. The more vot-
ers, the longer it takes the process to converge. This is illustrated in Figure 1, on
the Courses 2004 data set and T-shirt data set (results are similar for other data
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sets). On the x-axis is the time τ that the process begins; on the y-axis, the ratio
of games that converged in that time, out of all experiments in the same sub-class
(the sub-class of experiments are all experiments from a data set with the same
number of voters and the same τ ). The figures differ from one another because
the number of candidates in each of the data sets is different.
Table 7: Process convergence times
Data set ⇓ \ ⇒ Number of Voters 10 20 30
Courses 2004 (7) 6 13 19
Courses 2003 (8) 7 14 23
Sushi (10) 8 14 24
T-Shirts (11) 8 14 23
Required number of vote changes: Table 8 shows, for different data sets
and varying number of voters, the normalised average of vote changes required to
reach a consensus.
Table 8: Number of vote changes
10 voters 20 voters 30 voters
Datasets lazy proactive lazy proactive lazy proactive
Courses 2003 3.98 5.17 6.79 7.86 9.05 10.24
Courses 2004 3.55 5.73 6.38 9.51 8.89 12.71
Sushi 4 4.73 6.66 7.45 8.41 9.35
T-shirts 3.96 4.84 6.19 6.88 7.87 8.57
According to the Friedman test, there is a significant difference between the
number of vote changes performed by purely lazy and purely proactive voter sets.
According to the Bonferroni-Dunn test, proactive voters require a significantly
higher number of vote changes in order to reach consensus. Notice that, regardless
of the difference in the number of required vote changes, the convergence time for
both voter types is the same (see Theorem 1). That is, proactive voters do not
require more rounds to converge, but simply begin to change their votes sooner,
further away from the deadline.
Additive price of anarchy: The lower bound to the Additive Price of Anar-
chy was computed as the plurality score of the least-preferred candidate that was
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elected to be a unanimous winner in one of the 30,000 experiments, subtracted
from the plurality score of the truthful winner. Note that in order to determine the
real price of anarchy we must pursue every possibility. As 30,000 experiments
were used, our result is actually a lower bound to the price of anarchy. For exam-
ple, consider 12 voters and 4 candidates and the following scores at the beginning
of the process: sτc1 = 2, s
τ
c2
= 6, sτc3 = 1, s
τ
c4
= 3. The truthful plurality winner is
c2 with a score of 6. If in one of the experiments c3 is the unanimous winner, the
additive price of anarchy is 5. If c3 does not win in any of the experiments, but in
some of them c1 wins, the price is 4. Table 9 shows the normalised average of the
additive price of anarchy. For 20 voters the additive price of anarchy is somewhat
higher for proactive voters, however for 10 and for 30 voters the price of anarchy
is similar in all but one case. We could not confirm a significant difference using
the Friedman test. Less accurate measures such as a simple t-test reveal that the
additive price of anarchy is significantly higher for proactive voters, in the case
of 20 voters. Unfortunately, overall, statistical analysis was inconclusive, and no
significance test could decide the issue completely.
Table 9: Additive Price of Anarchy
10 voters 20 voters 30 voters
Datasets lazy proactive lazy proactive lazy proactive
Courses 2003 0.21 0.27 0.52 0.63 0.6 0.6
Courses 2004 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.18
Sushi 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.36 0.12 0.12
T-shirts 0.69 0.27 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.51
To conclude, it is interesting to note that although the convergence ratio is
equal for both voter types, the required number of vote changes is higher for the
proactive, rather than lazy, voters. Furthermore, the additive price of anarchy
seems to be equal or slightly higher for the proactive voters than for the lazy
voters. We thus did not see any reason to continue with the proactive voters, who
seem to be inferior to the lazy voters. Therefore, when designing the bots for our
user study (in the next section), we used only the lazy voter architecture.
5. CUD User study
The purpose of the user study was to examine whether human voters play in
a rational manner (more on our specific definition of the term “rational” below).
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Figure 1: Voting process convergence ratio—Courses-2004 (left) and T-shirt (right) data sets.
We built a game, called the CUD game which follows our CUD model structure.
The game was played by students as well as rational bots that were programmed
according to the lazy bot behavior described in Section 2. We herein describe the
game and the data collection method, and analyze the results.
5.1. CUD-Game flow
The framework contains 2 modules:
1. The CUD-Game3: a web-based interactive multi-player decision game de-
signed to facilitate an iterative group decision process. The game was im-
plemented as a Java server-client system with an online multilingual HTML
with Javascript interface. All voter’s actions were collected and saved to a
MySQL database. The game used a full-duplex asynchronous communica-
tion (Websocket protocol), to enable a fully interactive game between all
voters. The full system diagram is demonstrated in Figure 2.
2. The CUD-Runner4: a standalone Java application that received the data
collected by CUD-Game runs, and allowed us to simulate and analyze the
games.
3https://github.com/DavidBenYosef/CUDGame
4https://github.com/DavidBenYosef/CUDRunner
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Figure 2: CUD-Game System Diagram
Figure 3: Game running
The CUD-Game proceeds as follows: first, the game is activated at an agreed
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Figure 4: Final of the game.
time, so that all voters will play at the same time (while the game is off, the voters
are not able to log-in, and they receive an appropriate message). Once the game is
on, the users are required to confirm their participation in the research. Next, each
voter logs-in with a name and an identification number, and waits for the other
voters to join the game. The game begins once the predefined number of voters
is reached (Figure 3). When the number of logged voters exceeds the number
of voters for a game, other games begin simultaneously and independently. At
the beginning of the game, each voter receives a predefined preference profile
chosen uniformly at random. The highest preference for each voter is selected
automatically and the current result is shown.
On each round, each voter decides whether to change her current selection.
Voters that want to change their selection do so by selecting another alternative.
The voters are required to reply within a fixed time-span (usually set to 15 sec-
onds). Next, the system randomly selects one of the voters who applied for a
ballot change and computes the new intermediate results. The round ends. The
system checks whether the deadline has been reached and whether a consensus
has been reached. When the answer to both of these questions is negative, a new
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round begins with the display of the current ballots. If no consensus is reached by
the deadline, all voters receive 0 points. When a consensus is reached, each voter
receives a score corresponding to the chosen preference (Figure 4).
5.2. Reward method
One of the fundamental requirements from the CUD-Game is that no consen-
sus is the worst option for all voters, and that there will be no reward if consensus
is not reached. This is the reason why we decided to avoid using the Amazon Turk
platform as done by Tal et al. [9], since this platform requires paying the players
for logging in, regardless of their performance. In their research, Tal et al. [9]
faced “ghost” players that played only for the “show-up payment” and thus intro-
duced much noise into the collected data. In our research, we defined the term of
game points to represent an abstract reward layer. In each game, the voter had the
option to gain between 0 to 100 game points, e.g., when there are 5 candidates, the
score if the first preference is selected is 100 game points, the score for the second
preference is 80 game points, and so on, so that the score of the least-preferred
candidate is 20 game points. If there is no consensus by the deadline, the voter
get 0 game points. For example, if a certain candidate is chosen, and a voter has
this candidate ranked as his second preference, then he will receive 80 points for
this game.
The score for each voter is collected and saved, and can be converted and paid
in any relevant method later on. In our user-study we had undergraduate students
play the game, and the scores were converted to course bonus points (200 game
points were equivalent to 1 bonus point). Thus the students had a high incentive
to participate in the game, but participation was not obligatory; a student could
receive a perfect score in the course simply by receiving all points in the final
exam.
5.3. Irrational voters
We faced the problem of defining what voter moves should be considered
rational, and what voter moves should be considered irrational. There are many
“gray” areas that can be defined as rational or irrational actions, e.g., an action may
be a good action but not the best one possible. Moreover, sometimes performing
no action can be irrational, but since we cannot find and filter out voters who
are simply inattentive, defining no action as an irrational action might lead to an
extensive amount of noise in the data.
Therefore, we relaxed the model by defining a rational voter as a voter who
does not perform any active irrational actions. Consequently, irrational voters are
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votes that actively make actions that are irrational, i.e., actions that do not make
any sense. We define two types of irrational voters:
Definition 4. IRR1—a voter who opts to change his vote to a candidate cj ∈
C that he ranks lower than cmaj , the candidate with the current highest score.
Namely, the voter prefers cmaj over cj , but still would like to vote for cj .
If the voter realized that his current selection will not win, and decided to
change his selection, he should at least change to cmaj and not to a less preferred
candidate.
Definition 5. IRR2—a voter who opts to change his vote to a candidate cj ∈ C,
when there are other candidates that the voter prefers over cj , and furthermore
have a score that is higher than the score of cj . Namely, the voter opts to change
his vote for a less preferred candidate with fewer votes.
This behavior is irrational, since there is no reason to change to a less preferred
candidate, if this candidate also has a lower score.
The following example demonstrates the differences between the irrational
voters of type IRR1 and IRR2.
Example 5. Let there be a game with 6 voters and 5 candidates. Let voter i have
the following preferences: a i b, c i d, and d i e.
The game begins with voter i voting for his highest preference, a. The current
score vector is: s = (sa, sb, sc, sd, se) = (1, 0, 3, 2, 0). In all example figures, the
current selected candidate is surrounded by a black square, and the new selection
is surrounded by an orange square.
• IRR1 - Figure 5 - the voter decides to vote for d, which has a lower rank in
his preference profile than the popular candidate c, but a higher score than
the current selection.
• IRR2 - Figure 6 - the voter decides to vote for b, which has a lower score
and rank than a, but still a higher rank than the popular candidate c.
• Both IRR1 and IRR2 - Figure 7 - the voter decides to vote for e. Both
IRR1 and IRR2 definitions hold.
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Figure 5: IRR1 behavior scenario
Figure 6: IRR2 behavior scenario
Figure 7: Both IRR1 and IRR2 behavior scenario
We emphasize that we studied only voters that performed irrational actions.
For example, consider the following scenario: at time t = 6 before the deadline,
six changes are still required for the game to convergence. Voter does not opt to
change his vote. He might be relying on others to change their vote if no one else
does, so he is not defined as irrational. However, consider a more extreme case:
at time t = 1 before the deadline, all voters but the considered voter have agreed
on one candidate. If he does not change his vote, the game will not converge. But
we do not define this voter as irrational, since he has not performed any irrational
action. Since we cannot define him as rational in the first scenario and irrational
in the second scenario, we actually define only very irrational voters as irrational.
5.4. Data Collection and Metrics
Phase I: We ran the first experiment with a group of 160 students, who played
to receive five bonus points in a course that they took; every 200 game points
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were equal to one bonus point. The game configuration included: seven voters
per game, five candidates, ten rounds. Every voter was able to participate in an
unlimited number of games.
A total of 156 voters played a total of 397 games. In 366 games a consensus
was reached. The average convergence time was 5.10 rounds, meaning that most
games converged well before the deadline. We think that the convergence time
was very fast because the voters did not really try to maximize their outcome. As
they had an unlimited number of games, and their incentive being winning five
bonus points, they preferred any quick consensus and playing another game to
waiting for the last moment and possibly not gaining points.
Phase II: We ran another experiment with a few changes in order to address
the findings in the first phase. Again, the voters played to receive five bonus points
in a course they took, every 200 game points were equal to one bonus point, but
now we set a limit for the number of games per voter to 15 games, so that the
voters would remain motivated to play and “fight” for every point. In addition, by
defining an odd number of seven voters in the first phase, ties between candidates
were not possible. This meant the voters were required to make fewer decisions
in order to reach a consensus. It is easy for a voter to understand he should change
his vote if his preferred candidate is not the one with the most votes. But what
should a voter do when there are two candidates tied in first place, with an equal
number of votes? In order to capture these situations, we changed the number of
voters per game to be an even number of eight voters.
A total of 72 students played a total of 264 games: 144 mixed games with bots,
137 of them converged, and 120 games with no bots, 105 of them converged. Note
that the students had no idea whether they were playing against other students or
against bots.
Bot phase: We ran a set of bot-only games, eight bots per game. A total of
10000 bots played 1250 games. As expected, all of the games converged.
So how do humans (in our case, students) behave when asked to reach a con-
sensus? Are they rational? We want to identify how the irrational behavior of
students affects the games from different angles. First, we found no significant
difference in the number of irrational actions performed in the two first two games
of each student vs. later games. We thus concluded that the irrational actions are
not due to misunderstandings. We compared between games with irrational ac-
tions (IRR1 or IRR2) and games without irrational actions (rational games). We
examined all the data collected in the case studies—the first phase with students
only, and the second phase with students only, mixed games of students and bots,
and bot-only games.
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We examined:
• Convergence percentage—all bot-only games converge, of course. But how
do irrational actions affect the convergence of games?
• Average reward points—how do the users’ actions affect the average reward
points received in a game?
• The Additive Price of Anarchy for a process that has converged (Defini-
tion 3)
• Convergence time—how do user (and bot) actions affect the time it takes
the game to converge?
5.5. Game Results
In order to determine whether our results obtain a statistically significant dif-
ference with respect to the four different phases and with respect to the game state
(rational or irrational), we performed a two-way ANOVA analysis. All results
were found to be significantly different with pvalue < 0.05.
Figure 8 shows the influence of irrational actions on the convergence of the
games. Axis y displays the percentage of converged games out of all games. As
expected, we see that irrational actions lower the chances to reach an agreement
by 10%− 15%. We also see that bot-only games always converge, and that mixed
games converge in higher percentages than student-only games, since less vot-
ers can play irrational actions. An interesting comparison is between the student
games of Phase1 and Phase2. We see that the convergence of rational games of
Phase1 is higher than rational games of Phase2, however the convergence of ir-
rational games of Phase1 is lower than irrational games of Phase2. We explain
this phenomenon by the different configuration between the phases—in Phase1,
the voters had an unlimited number of games so they were not so motivated to
“fight”. When the results were good enough for them they played rationally, and
when not they “gave up” and started to play irrationally. In the second phase,
every voter had a limited number of games, so they were motivated to play even
when the game was not in their favor, so more games with irrational actions con-
verged. On the other hand, when playing rationally they tried to strategize, but
they miscalculated the needed strategic moves, and less games converged.
Next, we examine whether a high convergence percentage necessarily results
in a higher satisfaction, as theoretically a few converged game with high average
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Figure 8: Convergence percentage comparison
Figure 9: Average reward points comparison
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Figure 10: PoA comparison
reward might produce higher satisfaction than many converged games with low
average reward.
Figure 9 shows the global satisfaction factor, i.e., the average reward points per
game. We notice a full correlation with the convergence percentage (Figure 8); we
see a consistent decrease in the satisfaction factor in games with irrational votes.
This is to be expected since when a voter plays irrationally, he plays against his
interests, and more games do not converge, resulting in a decrease in satisfaction.
The global satisfaction of the rational games of Phase1 is higher than the games
of Phase2, and the global satisfaction of irrational games of Phase1 is lower than
the games of Phase2. This again correlates with the finding on the convergence
percentage; students do not strategize well. When they play rationally and are
motivated to play and fight, the global satisfaction decreases.
Our most important finding is found here: we see that the global satisfaction
increases when bots play with students, and reaches its highest value in bot-only
games. In other words, bots are better than student players, even if they are ra-
tional student players. Bots in a game (a student-bot game or a bot-only game)
increase convergence percentage and increase the satisfaction of all voters, bots
and students alike.
Additive price of anarchy: Next, we examined the PoA and the convergence
time factors between converged games with rational actions and converged games
with irrational actions. We avoided comparing games that ended with deadlock,
as the factors for these games are not defined. Since we have one winner for each
game, we did not compute the exact price of anarchy or the lower bound (as in
Section 4). Rather, we computed the score of the plurality winner in the truthful
profile minus the score of the final winner in the game.
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Figure 11: Convergence time comparison
Figure 10 presents the comparison of the PoA factor for rational and irra-
tional games that converged. The PoA factor represents the distance between the
truthful majority winner and the actual unanimity winner. We see that irrational
actions cause a higher PoA, since irrational voters play against their interests and
may sometimes become the deciding factor, resulting in a consensus which is not
the majority winner. We see differences between the PoA of rational games of
Phase1 and Phase2. We explain it by the difference in the number of voters per
game (7 voters in the first phase and 8 in the second phase). An even number
of voters may cause ties between candidates, this leads to a higher PoA, as ties
commonly cause a “leader switch” so the final winner is different from the Plu-
rality winner. We also identify a big influence of irrational actions in the mixed
games. After further investigation, we identified that when playing with irrational
students, bots reached a higher average score. We conclude that bots manage to
“recover” from irrational actions better than students do, and to reach the best
possible option considering the new situation. Interestingly, we see that the PoA
of bot-only games is higher than the PoA of games with rational students. In
fact, a high PoA joint with a global satisfaction improvement is an indication of
good strategic moves. Bots strategies change the majority winner to some other
candidate, leading to an improvement in the global satisfaction.
Figure 11 demonstrates the comparison of the convergence time factor for
rational and irrational games. The convergence time is the number of rounds
the game took to converge. Convergence time 10 is the slowest, and it means
the game converged only on the last round. We see that irrational actions cause
the games to converge slower, as all other voters need to adapt their logic to the
unexpected results. As described above, we identified that Phase2 student games
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converged slower than Phase1 games, as the voters were motivated to play due
to the limitation in the number of games inflicted on the Phase2 voters. Phase2-
mixed games converge even slower, and bot-only games converge the slowest, as
bot logic makes them converge only when necessary. Students converge faster
since they are afraid of losing all the points, so they prefer not to wait until the last
round, while bots are not afraid since they assume the other voters will work with
the same logic.
Conclusion: Perhaps not surprisingly, there are differences between students
and bots. Perhaps the bots’ main weakness is that they operate under the as-
sumption that all other voters (who are also bots) have the same logic. However,
students do not hold the same assumption about other students. Games played by
students converge faster since students are concerned that the game will not con-
verge and end in deadlock (the worst option for all involved), so they prefer not
to wait until the last round. For the same reason, a single student playing against
bots can manipulate them and change the outcome in his favor, meaning that the
result is not necessarily the option preferred by the majority. However, bots in-
crease the convergence percentage and increase the satisfaction of all voters, bots
and students alike.
6. Related Work
In a Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD) game, a consensus on one alternative
must be reached within a fixed deadline. If the voters do not reach a consensus, a
deadlock is declared.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze theoretical fea-
tures of CUD games in iterative voting, and to demonstrate them experimentally,
with a focus on convergence time and final outcome quality. Furthermore, we
study human behavior in CUDs, our goal being to examine whether humans be-
have rationally.
6.1. Iterative Voting Games and the question of convergence
A CUD game is a type of iterative voting game, e.g., [10, 11, 12, 5, 13]. How-
ever, CUDs have several unique features. First, although CUDs do utilise a known
voting rule, they work directly with the set of possible winners (i.e., alternatives
that might be chosen by the majority), and behave much like non-myopic games
based on local-dominance (see, e.g., [14, 15, 16]). On the other hand, the distinc-
tion between lazy and proactive voter behaviour links CUDs with biased voting
(see, e.g., [17]).
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The standard assumption in the iterative voting literature is that voting pro-
cesses do not terminate, unless no voter has a way to further manipulate the out-
come. Convergence is the subject of an extensive research effort, both to deter-
mine when these processes terminate and with what ballot profile ([10, 11, 18, 5,
19]). CUDs, on the other hand, always terminate and declare a winner (see Theo-
rem 1). Our framework will always converge if the voters are rational and there is
a sufficient amount of time before the deadline.
Some models focus on choosing one alternative with a certain degree of con-
sensus. The consensus can be a simple majority, a majority of 2/3 and so forth.
For example, a Papal Conclave has to choose the next pope with a majority of
at least 2/3. The voting process continues infinitely until the required majority
is reached. Here, the voters’ degree of indifference to time plays a major role.
For example, Kweik [20] has shown that when all voter preferences are known in
advance, the outcome may be predicted, and it favors the voter with the highest
indifference to time.
Reijngoud et al. [21] analyzed the iterated voting model from different angles:
how the amount of information received in one single poll influences the manipu-
lated behavior of the voter, and how repeated polls affect the manipulated behavior
of all voters. Braˆnzei et al. [4] studied the different influence of strategic voting
on the main voting methods. They defined the Price Of Anarchy (POA) factor that
measures the differences between truthful voting and worse-case manipulated vot-
ing. POA is one of the measures we use in our experimental evaluation.
6.2. Deadline
A feature that distinguishes our framework from other iterative voting pro-
cesses is the deadline. Informally, the deadline is a time limit on the voting pro-
cess.
Bargaining models often have a deadline; however, they do not usually require
a consensus or the selection of one alternative only. Rather, the outcome may be
a compromise among the most-preferred outcomes by all participants. Deadlines
are defined as “[f]ixed time limits that end a negotiation” [22, 23]. Experimental
studies of bargaining deadlines have shown that the majority of agreements are
obtained in the final seconds before the deadline [24, 25]. Even complete infor-
mation does not speed agreement much, contrary to what might be expected [26];
moreover, agents are convinced that revealing their deadlines may decrease their
payoffs, contrary to what is proven theoretically [27]. The concession rate in-
creases as the deadline approaches [28, 29, 24]. If the deadline is soon enough,
then the agents converge almost immediately, but if the deadline is long enough
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away, there probably appears a delayed equilibrium [30]. If the deadlines are dif-
ferent for the agents and are common knowledge for everyone, then the theory
predicts an inmediate equilibrium [20], yet some experiments show that there will
be delays [31]. However, there is a probability that no agreement will be reached
before the deadline; depending on the context, more than half [22] or at least one
third [32] of all negotiations may fail. Nonetheless, a moderate deadline has a
positive effect on the outcome [23]. Our model does not encompass negotiation
or bargaining.
6.3. Human Behavior in Voting Games
On-line platforms such as Doodle allow people to submit their votes on the
problem in question, to view the votes of other group members, and to change
their votes if they wish. Zou et al. [33] studied strategic voting behavior in Doo-
dle polls, and how the knowledge of current voters’ preferences affected results.
Interestingly, people tend to change their vote preferences in light of the votes of
their peers. In our model, voter preferences are private, and voters can only see
intermediate aggregated results.
Tal et al. [9] performed a study of human behavior in online voting. They
classified voters into three distinct types, two of which are not strategic and one
that will perform straightforward strategic moves. However their setting does not
contain a deadline. Moreover, while they provide valuable insights on human vot-
ing patterns, they do not compare their framework with a rational strategic model,
so the question of whether humans and bots act alike remained unanswered.
7. Discussion
We present a novel model for an iterative voting process with a restricted num-
ber of iterations—Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD). We chose the sequential
vote modification process because it is motivated by real-life scenarios (such as
the school registration problem discussed in Section 1), and also since this is a
widespread assumption in the iterative voting literature.
After studying the theoretical features of the CUD we find that when there are
candidates whose lack of votes is smaller than the time until the deadline (there
is enough time so that voters can switch their votes to this alternative), then the
CUD converges with one of these candidates as a winner. Moreover, if there is a
candidate for whom at least half of the voters voted, then the CUD converges with
one of these candidates as a winner.
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Obviously not all individuals behave identically. We define two types of vot-
ers, proactive and lazy. Proactive voters are, in a sense, trigger-happy to change
their vote, even if just to ensure that their preferred possible winner gets one more
point. Lazy voters change their votes only when it is necessary to do so, i.e.,
when their vote is pivotal to keeping a particular alternative as a possible winner.
Though it is natural to see proactive voters as those that actively seek consensus,
they reap no benefit from their activism. Specifically, convergence time of both
proactive and lazy voter CUDs are the same. On the other hand, as our experi-
ments show, the number of vote changes until convergence is higher for proactive
voters. In a way, they are inefficient in their behavior.
Theoretical results show PoA+ principal bounds, but yield no specific trade-
offs. Hence, our experiments also took a deeper look into Additive PoA as a
measure of winner quality. While re-confirming PoA+ bounds experimentally,
our experiments indicate that there is no difference between the PoA+ of lazy and
proactive voters. Thus, when designing voter bots, we designed them according
to lazy voter behavior.
As the next step, we developed the CUD-Game, a game developed in order to
collect and analyze human behavior (students in our case). We implemented voter
bots, which follow the theoretical model in Section 2, and compared it with data
collected in a user study. We used the CUD-Game to run a user study and examine
how students reach an agreement, i.e., a consensus, within a tight deadline. The
game enabled us to compare the students’ behavior to rational (lazy) bot behavior.
The results of decisions made only by bots, seem to have higher quality than
when humans reach decisions. A reasonable conclusion is that when we want
to know that a decision will converge, and that all voters will be as satisfied as
possible with the result, then it is best for users to leave bots to reach a decision
on their behalf. A user can notify his personal bot of his preferences, and let the
bot represent him in the decision making process.
Bots are playing ever-larger roles in our daily lives. We rely on them for nav-
igation directions (e.g., Google Maps or Waze), we rely on them for information
retrieval (e.g., any search engine), and we may one day rely on them when at-
tempting to reach a group decision. This research is a step in that direction.
7.1. Future Work
One challenging extension is to adapt our model to use general Positional
Scoring Rules (PSRs), rather than simple Majority, e.g., veto, approval, and Borda.
These rules would allow us to express more complex semantic structures over the
set of alternatives, even if we stay with the committee example. For instance,
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committee members may need to decide on a candidate and the pay grade. Some
members may vote for a particular candidate, but veto a higher pay-grade, if they
believe the candidate is not ready for a higher rank. At the same time, other com-
mittee members may be indifferent between two reasonable candidates. In these
cases, veto and approval voting are more appropriate than Majority.
Stepping even further away from our basic model, we need to investigate what
information about the current vote affects a CUD’s outcome, and in what way.
For example, rather than using utilities that depend on an anonymous score vector,
we can use weights to express the fact that the opinion of certain voters is more
influential. The same technique would allow us to impose a price on the number
of times a voter changes her ballot, e.g., her vote loses influence, being unstable.
Simultaneous re-voting would be another research direction, entailing very non-
trivial modifications.
Finally, there are additional methods to measure the quality of an agreement
point. While in this paper we chose to concentrate on Additive PoA, various
measures of social welfare are also popular in the voting literature, and we intend
to pursue them as well.
As for our developed framework, we hope to accommodate real-life decisions
instead of games. Hopefully, voters will be able to set their preferences for real
decisions that they care about, and then use the system to find a consensus. Lastly,
it would be interesting to investigate and develop bots who change their strategies
depending on whether other voters are humans or bots.
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